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NOTES AND COMMENTS
dom of expression can hardly carry impli-
cations that nullify the guarantees of im-
partial trials. . . .The need is great that
courts be ... allowed to do their duty. 2 4
The process of justice surely does not
exhibit a perfect stability as it presently
exists. It would appear unwise, therefore,
to inject an additional variable into the
multifarious problems already extant. That
the education of the public is a valid, in-
deed a laudable, ideal, does not, of itself,
excuse an intrusion into the normal court-
24Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 284
(1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The right of privacy has been defined
as the individual's right to be free from
unwarranted intrusions and publicity. It is,
in essence, "the right of the individual to
be let alone."' Although the right of pri-
vacy appears to be a recently emerging
doctrine, its basis can be traced to the
laws of ancient Greece and Rome, and to
the Anglo-Saxon common law,2 whereat
1 Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890).
2 HOFSTADTER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT
OF PRIVACY IN NEW YORK 1-7 (1954); Pound,
Interests in Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343,
357 (1915). For example, subsequent to the
passage of the New York statute, the Supreme
Court of Georgia condemned the Roberson de-
room procedure. Justice can not be made
an experiment - that the televising of a
trial may not be deleterious is obviously
not a sufficient justification for the utiliza-
tion of this technique.
A great segment of respected opinion re-
jects the entree of the television camera
onto the trial scene. Moreover, the psycho-
logical effects of television coverage upon
the defendant, the judge, the jury and the
general public could vitiate the meaning of
a fair and open trial. The mere possibility
of this danger militates against television
in the courtroom at this time. The same
reasoning would reject any innovation
which might tend to jeopardize the life or
liberty of even a single accused.
protection was granted only from physical
interference with life and property. In its
development, a trend has evolved which
cision as repugnant to the ordinary concepts of
justice, and espoused a concept that there was a
distinct non-statutory right of privacy which is
capable of judicial recognition. Despite the lack
of common-law precedent or commentary as a
determinative factor, support was found for the
decision in the natural law and in the state and
federal constitutional guarantees that no person
shall be deprived of liberty. However, the use of
constitutional guarantees as a foundation for the
right has been criticized as being logically weak.
The Constitution and Bill of Rights, although
recognizing in the abstract the existence of the
right of privacy, do not allocate to each individ-
ual his specific personal rights against such an
invasion. These provisions furnish only the safe-
guards and bulwarks against governmental power.
evidences a fuller recognition and appre-
ciation of the more intangible and spiritual
values inherent in the scope of protection
afforded by the right.3
The best known exposition of a "mod-
ern" right of privacy is found in the often-
cited law review article by Samuel D. War-
ren and Louis D. Brandeis.4 In reviewing
early decisions granting relief for violation
of privacy on the basis of defamation, in-
vasion of a property right, and breach of
contract or of implied trust, the authors
determined that an underlying theory per-
meated such decisions; this theory was "the
right of privacy."
The right of privacy is presently pro-
tected in the vast majority of jurisdictions
in the United States., In some jurisdictions
the right is based solely upon statute; in
others, the right finds its basis in the con-
stitution, in the natural law or as an evolu-
tion of the early common law.6 In either
case, an expanded right of privacy is one
that has received only recent recognition.
Its development has been revolutionary,
even in its most conservative form, and it
has arisen in an area which, prior to 1890,
was only scantily recognized. This note
shall discuss the present status of the right
of each individual to a share of privacy,
3 Nizer, The Right of Privacy: A Half Century's
Development, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526, 527-28
(1941).
4 Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1.
5 PROSSER, TORTS § 112 at 831-32 (3d ed. 1964).
6 Comment, 16 U. DET. L.J. 78 (1952). While
some jurisdictions recognize the right as an
evolutionary concept, others do not. New York,
for example, rejected evolutionary foundations
and pioneered in the statutory coverage. Pavesich
v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50
S.E. 68 (1905) (acceptance of evolutionary
foundations); Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902)
(rejection of evolutionary foundations).
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and will attempt to predict the ultimate
resolution of various problems created by
the extension of the right.
Evolution and Scope of the
Common-Law Right
Intrusion
In those jurisdictions which have recog-
nized the common-law right of privacy, the
developing case law has been penetrating
and extensive.7 Early in the common law
of the United States, it was recognized that
physical intrusion violated the right of
privacy.8 This concept of unauthorized in-
trusion was logically extended in the case
of Rhodes v. Graham9 to the tapping of
telephone wires running into the plaintiff's
home. The court held that such action con-
stituted an unwarranted intrusion, ergo, an
invasion of the right of privacy.
Exposition of Public Facts
Generally, an act will constitute a vio-
lation of privacy at common law if it con-
stitutes a prying or intrusion into a private
matter which would be offensive to a
reasonable man.10 On the other hand,
if the matter is public, e.g., a public docu-
7 See generally Green, The Right of Privacy, 27
ILL. L. REV. 237 (1932).
s DeMay v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146
(1881) allowed recovery against a physician who
allowed an unauthorized man to accompany him
during a childbirth. See generally Ludwig, "Peace
of Mind" In 48 Pieces vs. Uniform Right of
Privacy, 32 MINN. L. REV. 734, 735 (1948).
9238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931); see also
McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939), wherein
recovery was allowed for the use of microphones
in a hospital room.
10 Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 At]. 34
(Ch. 1929). An unauthorized investigation into
a bank account was enjoined. See generally Pros-
ser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389-92
(1960).
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ment, death certificate, or photograph taken
while part of the public scene, there is no
recognized invasion because one impliedly
consents to the revelation." Therefore,
under normal circumstances, if a fact is
public in nature, there can be no intrusion
or invasion of privacy in obtaining it. Anal-
ysis reveals that although the public record
factor is of importance in determining the
difference between public and private facts,
it is not to be considered conclusive.
In the case of Melvin v. Reid,1 2 the
plaintiff, formerly a prostitute, had been a
defendant in a sensational murder trial.
After her acquital she abandoned her prior
"profession" and became a virtuous mem-
ber of society. Subsequently, a motion pic-
ture was exhibited which utilized her name
and past as revealed on the record of the
murder trial. The court held that even
though the incidents used were part of the
public record, the movie was a direct inva-
sion of her right of privacy. 13 Thus, al-
though the disclosure in Melvin was of a
public record, the decision is indicative of
the fact that there is something in the na-
ture of a "mores" test by which liability
exists for publicity given to those things
which the customs and ordinary views of
the community will not tolerate.
Disclosure
In addition to intrusion, the common-
law jurisdictions have also held the public
disclosure of embarrassing private facts,
11 Note, 44 VA. L. REV. 1303 (1958).
12 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
13 Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac.
91 (1931); see Man v. Rio Grande Oil Co., 28
F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939). Contra, Sidis
v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
e.g., publicizing delinquent accounts, 4 to
be generally actionable as a violation of
the right of privacy. In this situation, it is
the publicity afforded the private mattcr
which is actionable, not the invasion or in-
trusion. Hence, a garageman who notified
the community that a customer's payment
was past due by means of a sign posted in
his window violated the customer's right of
privacy. 5
It is important to realize that truth, which
is usually a defense to an action for de-
famation, is not a defense to an action for
invasion of privacy. Thus, the fact that th .
plaintiff actually owed the money wou'd
not alter the determination. It appears,
therefore, that the common-law jurisdc-
tions have been able to develop, in the area
of publications, an extension of the law of
defamation which is not confined by the
defense of truth. 16
Appropriations
The most recently protected area, in
common-law jurisdictions, deals with the
individual's right to be free from the com-
mercial exploitation of his identity. 1'7 In
regard to this phase of the common-law
right, it is necessary to note that it applies
only to natural living persons; corporations,
deceased persons and animals are thus ex-
cluded.' Generally, the exploitation takes
14 Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967
(1927).
1" Ibid.; see Kacedan, The Right of Privacy, 12
B.U.L. REV. 353, 376-79 (1932).
16 Prosser, supra note 10, at 398.
17This area corresponds with that protected by
statute, see Ludwig, supra note 8, at 747.
18 See generally Nizer, supra note 3, at 549-53.
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 397 prohibits the use of
the name or identity of a nonprofit association or
corporation organized exclusively for charitable,
patriotic or religious purposes for advertising
purposes or purposes of trade. This legislation
the form of appropriation of the plaintiff's
name or likeness for the defendant's bene-
fit.19 Recovery for appropriation can be
had if a photograph or likeness is published
in or as part of an advertisement, or used
in connection with an article of fiction,
since either would have an advantageous
commercial use. On the other hand, recov-
ery has been denied when an identity is
utilized in news or material which is edu-
cational or informative in nature since it
is the public at large which reaps the bene-
fit, and not the defendant. Between the
poles of news and fiction there appear to
be no guidelines by which the eventual
determination of a specific case may be
reached. However, courts have generally
applied a de minimis rule in order to avoid
the consequences of a violation of the right
in extreme situations. 20 For example, a
sailor who had posed for a recruiting poster
which appeared as background in nine out
of 8,500 feet of film was unable to re-
cover.
21
The Evolution and Scope of the
Statutory Right of Privacy
Schuyler v. Curtis22 was the earliest New
York case acknowledging the possible ex-
istence of a right to privacy. In Schuyler,
was mainly designed to operate in regard to
services and sale of goods. University of Notre
Dame v. Twentieth Century-Fox, 22 App. Div.
2d 452, 455-56, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301, 305 (1st
Dep't), afl'd, 15 N.Y.2d 904, 207 N.E.2d 508,
259 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1965),40 NOTRE DAME LAW.
330 (1965).
19 Prosser, supra note 10, at 401.
20 Ludwig, supra note 8, at 742.
21 Freed v. Loews, Inc., 175 Misc. 716, 24
N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
22 15 N.Y. Supp. 787 (Sup. Ct. 1892); see Pave-
sich v. New England Life Ins. Co., supra note 6,
at 207-10, 50 S.E. at 75-76.
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the trial court enjoined the display of a
statue of a deceased person because she
had not attained public notoriety. The
Court of Appeals, however, held that if any
right of privacy existed at all, it did not
survive after death and could not be en-
forced by the relatives of the deceased. The
tenor of the Court's opinion indicated that
New York was not disposed, at that time,
to recognize a right of privacy as a legal
entity, or to entertain its invasion as the
basis for an independent cause of action.
In Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Co.,2 3 the Court of Appeals clarified the
New York position when it declared that
no common-law right of privacy existed in
the state. This decision was primarily based
upon three factors: (1) the lack of com-
mon-law precedent; (2) the mental char-
acter of the injury; and (3) the fear of a
deluge of litigation. 21 In response to the
storm of professional and popular dis-
approval following this holding, the legis-
lature created a statutory right of privacy. 25
This highly specific enactment made it both
a misdemeanor and a tort to make use of
the name, portrait or picture of any living
person for advertising purposes, or for
23 Supra note 6. Defendant, without knowledge
or consent of plaintiff, printed and circulated in
public places about twenty-five thousand like-
nesses of plaintiff, a young woman, with the
words, "Flour of the Family" and the name of
the milling company on each print. The Court
of Appeals refused to enjoin the defendant.
24 Kacedan, supra note 15, at 621-22.
25 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1903, ch. 132, §§ 1, 2 (em-
bodied in N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51).
The statute was held constitutional in Rhodes
v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 193 N.Y. 223, 85
N.E. 1097 (1908), afl'd, 220 U.S. 502 (1911).
See generally HOFSTADTER, op. cii. supra note 2,
at 12, 13; Note, 9 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 159
(1934).
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purposes of trade without the person's
written consent.
Both the common-law and the statutory
jurisdictions protect a living person's iden-
tity from commercial exploitation. In the
statutory jurisdictions, however, the legis-
lature provides the sole protection. The
New York statute, and those patterned
after it,26 prohibit the use of the name, por-
trait or picture of any living natural per-
son without his written consent for ad-
vertising purposes or purposes of trade.2 7
Although the statutory right appears some-
what restricted, there has been no signifi-
cant difference of application in this area
as compared with the common-law juris-
dictions.2 1 Roth statutory and common-law
jurisdictions recognize that the unauthor-
ized use of another's name or picture for
commercial purposes cannot be counte-
nanced.
The problems involved in determining an
actionable violation of the right in a statu-
tory jurisdiction are illustrated by the re-
cent decision of University of Notre Dame
v. Twentieth Century-Fox,29 wherein the
2rOKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839-40
(1958) which is similar to the New York legis-
lation, except that it provides greater protection
of privacy by requiring the written consent of
descendants for fifty years after the subject's
death or, if there are no descendants, it protects
the memory of the deceased for fifty years. Viola-
tion is a felony. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-7, 8,
9 (1953) follows New York generally but in-
cludes prohibition of commercial exploitation of
public institutions and public officials. It also
protects against the use of a deceased's likeness
by requiring written consent of the personal rep-
resentative or heir. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-650
(1957) limits protection to residents of the
state.
27 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51.
28 Prosser, supra note 10, at 401.
"922 App. Div. 2d 452, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301,
afl'd, 15 N.Y.2d 904, 207 N.E.2d 508, 259
N.Y.S.2d 832 (1965).
President of the University sought relief
under Sections 50 and 51 of the New York
Civil Rights Law. The court noted that he
was named only in two brief passages in the
book John Goldfarb, Please Come Home,
and not at all in the film. In applying the
de minimis rule, this was considered to be
of "fleeting and incidental nature which the
Civil Rights Law does not find offensive."30
The University, being an incorporated in-
stitution was afforded no right of privacy
under the statute. The court concluded by
stating that since Notre Dame's grievances
sounded in defamation, its remedy lay at
law in libel, not in equity for invasion of
the right of privacy.
Although the right-of-privacy statutes
afford protection similar to that offered in
common-law jurisdictions, they have an in-
herent defect since their applicability is
severely limited to certain enumerated
instances. While legislation encompasses
the most common method of invasion of
privacy, other flagrant abuses actionable at
common law, such as wiretapping and
eavesdropping, are outside the statutory
protection. In addition, the statutes pro-
hibit only the use of a name or likeness.
The publication of embarrassing intimate
details of private life is without their scope.
Viewing the New York statute mechan-
ically, it appears to be plagued with a dual
character. Its penal sanction and the fact
that it is unrecognized in New York's com-
mon law require that it be given strict inter-
pretation.31 However, its remedial purpose
would seem to foster an expansive liberal
30 University of Notre Dame v. Twentieth Cen-
tury-Fox, 22 App. Div. 2d 452, 454, 256 N.Y.S.
2d 301, 304 (1st Dep't 1965).
31 Binns v. Vitograph, 210 N.Y. 51, 55, 103
N.E. 1108, 1110 (1913).
construction. The resulting stresses have
caused confusion, and have narrowed its
effectiveness by limiting and restricting its
apparent purpose to the literal confines of
the statute. It has been remarked that the
statute "has never emerged from its
shadow.'' 32 Thus, in an area where the
statutory right could have surpassed the
protection provided by the common law,
the New York statute, instead, followed
the common law by denying public insti-
tutions, corporations or deceased persons
the right of privacy.
3
The rationale for withholding recognition
of a right of privacy in a deceased person
appears to be that it is a personal right of
the deceased34 and further, that the exercise
of such a right would impose burdensome
restrictions upon the freedom of the press.3 5
This reasoning, however, would seem fal-
lacious in both respects. It is not the de-
ceased's privacy, but that of his relations
which is invaded by unwarranted disclo-
sure concerning him.36 In addition, recog-
nition of the right would not impose upon
the communications media any greater re-
striction than now exists for a living person,
and the exceptions relating to public figures
and newsworthiness would still be appli-
cable. Statutory protection against the use
of a deceased's likeness is already adopted
to a limited degree in other states and by the
32 HOFSTADTER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN NEW YORK 13 (1954).
33 However, it is interesting to note that N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 397 does provide this protec-
tion for religious, benevolent and educational
associations.
34 Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22
(1895).
35Comment, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 109.
36 Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REV.
460 (1934); Note, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 324
(1965).
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federal government. 7 This type of legisla-
tion appreciates the continuing character of
the deceased's identity, and protects his
memory and those persons closely related to
him from commercial exploitation.
The Federal Right of Privacy
Increased appreciation of the rights of the
individual in general, must be accompanied
by an increased sensitivity to the right of an
individual to be "left alone." The United
States Supreme Court recognized this right
in Griswold v. Connecticut.38 Although the
facts of Griswold necessarily limit its con-
clusion and impact, the recognition of any
facet of the right of privacy must be consid-
ered a significant development. The sub-
ject of the discussion in Griswold was a Con-
necticut statute which had historically made
the use of contraceptive devices a criminal
offense. In holding the statute to be uncon-
stitutional, the Supreme Court declared that
implicit in the United States Constitution is
a right to privacy in the marital relationship;
that the Connecticut statute abridged that
right; and that this statute was also in viola-
tion of due process, as stated in the four-
teenth amendment.
Thus, the Court has directly postulated
that a right of privacy is extant in one
sphere. Although this sphere is the marital
relationship, an historically sacrosanct area,
37 For the states involved, see supra note 26.
Federal law prohibits the registration of a trade-
mark if it consists "of or comprises a name,
portrait, or signature identifying a particular liv-
ing individual except by his written consent, or
of the name, signature or portrait of a deceased
President of the United States during the life of
his widow, if any, except by the written consent
of the widow." 60 Stat. 428 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §
1052(c) (1964).
38 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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the case may be the precursor of significant
applications of the right in other areas.
It must be stressed that the right, as inter-
preted in the Griswold case, is a right to be
free from governmental interference, at both
the state and federal levels. Therefore, any
extensions of the Griswold doctrine will
be available only as rights of action against
governmental agents. Invasions, by indi-
viduals, of the privacy of other individuals,
whether that privacy be of the marital rela-
tionship or otherwise, is apparently not in-
cluded in Griswold's impact. This conclu-
sion flows from the fact that in other areas,
where governmental interference with indi-
viduals has been proscribed as violative of
the constitution, e.g., illegal searches and
seizures, similar actions by individuals have
not been proscribed.
Conclusion
The need for legislative updating of the
right of privacy in New York and other
states with similar approaches, whether
statutory or not, is evident. What is required
is intensive examination of the current status
of the position of these jurisdictions in rela-
tion to that of other states and foreign coun-
tries. Original legislation is necessary not
only to place these jurisdictions at the level
of the more liberal jurisdictions, but also to
insure the proper development of this right
within a dynamic society. The nationwide
syndicated press and network communica-
tion systems require that the individual be
afforded a more uniform protection, since
these scientific advances have multiplied the
potential for infringement of his privacy. In
addition, the advent of electronic eavesdrop-
ping devices greatly increases the possibility
of intrusions designed solely to acquire and
disclose injurious information in order to
satisfy personal vengeance. Such activity
would not constitute commercial exploita-
tion, and if the information was truthful,
the injured party would lack a remedy.
Lastly, if a New York revision is effected,
there exists the distinct possibility that it
may be adopted as the nucleus of uniform
legislation. With this in mind, it seems that
New York should enlarge the right of pri-
vacy and overcome the inadequacies cre-
ated by anachronistic approaches, thereby
creating a common denominator in an area
otherwise without a standard.
